On September 10, 2024, the Mises Institute published an article by Philipp Bagus and Bernardo Ferrero (B&F) that changed my life as an advocate and apprentice in the Austro-libertarian tradition of political and economic thought. In response to my criticism of Javier Milei, Argentina’s current president, on LewRockwell.com and Mises.org, the two economists—known for their academic expertise within the same tradition—came to Milei’s defense.
Although it could be argued that I have already addressed the entirety of B&F’s article across five separate pieces, there are still a few loose ends to tie up. Specifically, the series of false accusations and other half-truths spread by B&F about me. Below, I will compile my responses regarding various areas of government and include the falsehoods and half-truths mentioned, together with a new conclusion that serves as the cherry on top of B&F’s resounding failure.
Part One: Public Debt
As appears in an excerpt from “Repudiating the Argentine Debt” (January 2025):
In defense of Milei, others argue that one needs to consider the political costs of repudiation, which, according to these defenders of Milei, “might well be critical, especially in a country like Argentina that defaulted so often without ever really resurrecting.” Thus, apparently, they argue that Milei pondered such costs and decided to not repudiate. However, Milei never bothered to defend the repudiation of any debt, and he even legitimized with libertarian rhetoric the repayment of public debt just a few weeks before the elections. Moreover, if Argentina did not resurrect after having defaulted before, it was because its political leaders continued to make mistakes that led them to get into debt or ruin their currency over and over again—some of which these defenders cite and explain very well: “… the central bank monetized fiscal deficits. Since 2002, Argentina’s politicians used inflation as a means of financing public consumption and profligacy in excess of legislated taxes, externalizing costs onto (money) savers, creditors, fixed-income recipients and low wage-earners.” Hence, if Milei was supposed to be the man to stop making so many mistakes, and in fact he has already stopped making several, it is precisely with Milei that defaulting should have been worth it to resurrect this time. Besides, these Milei’s defenders should be asked what exactly those political costs are, because defending Milei on the basis of political costs without citing any specific political costs is rather sophistry. And yet, the most relevant and unequivocal political cost is actually leaving the political and financial classes without a way to steal from taxpayers and benefit from government manipulation of money and credit. So, rendering government debt securities worthless does not amount to expropriating anyone’s legitimate IOUs, but to stopping a mode of expropriation of taxpayers that is only possible through taxation or inflation.
On the other hand, if repudiating debts was not politically feasible, abolishing the central bank was for Milei, because he proposed it, although he has not yet succeeded. Therefore, if Milei had not proposed abolishing the central bank and some would claim today that he has not achieved or proposed a goal consistent with Rothbard’s ideals such as abolishing central banking, a defender of Milei against this claim could say that such a goal was simply not politically feasible, and that this is the reason why Milei did not opt for it—given that libertarianism does not necessarily bind the libertarian politician or strategist to an all-or-nothing agenda, but to at least trying to achieve goals in the right direction. However, Milei himself invalidates any such defense in his favor, because, in his own words, he does not put certain people around him to be told that something is not feasible, but to be told how to achieve it. And this, by inductive reasoning, means that Milei has not been concerned about the feasibility of repudiating any debt, because if he had wanted to repudiate any debt, feasibility would not have been a reason not to try nor to declare the goal of repudiation, since he does give his reasons for declared goals that he has not yet achieved.
But then, given the facts, a question arises: Why would a libertarian defend Milei, and with reasons he never gave, from not having done something that not only he never proposed or defended, but something against his own promises and government actions on the matter?
Nevertheless, had Milei advocated repudiation, at least some significant repudiation could have been attempted to free taxpayers of an equivalent or substantial amount in taxes. The Argentine people could have been relieved of any payments related to such debts, and repudiation could have gone a long way toward lessening the negative impact of government affairs on the economy and taxpayers, apart from helping the fiscal soundness that Milei wanted.
Part Two: Monetary Policy
As appears in “Quantity and Quality of the Argentine Peso” (May 2025):
For decades, Argentina’s currency has failed remarkably in its future purchasing power compared to other currencies. This includes recurring devaluations, hyperinflations and periods of systematic rejection by Argentinians, who prefer the dollar to save and calculate. So much so that when Javier Milei became their president in December 2023, he found a currency—the peso—kept alive by legal tender laws and anti-dollar regulations. There was basically only exchange demand for pesos, but no or very little demand for pesos to maintain purchasing power.
In September 2024, economists Philipp Bagus and Bernardo Ferrero (B&F) defended Milei from criticism and argued as follows:
What Grau ignores is that price inflation was tamed as a result of two, interlocking phenomena: the slow but steady decrease in the avenues of monetary emission and the increase in the quality of the monetary regime.
Here, Milei’s defenders will be put to the test.
Quantity of Money
B&F discussed the monetary base expansion in Alberto Fernández’s four years (Milei’s predecessor), and highlighted the expansion of his last year. However, Milei had already surpassed Fernández’s expansion by September 2024. The official monetary base (M0) had increased 133.1%, and looking back at Milei’s first year, the increase was 209.1%, which is much more than Fernández’s last year (84.8%). Therefore, beyond ceasing Treasury financing, there was no “steady decrease.”
Nevertheless, according to B&F, by achieving fiscal surplus and declaring the elimination of deficits non-negotiable, Milei established a “firm” monetary anchor. Still, although inflationary expectations were significantly reduced, this anchor is linked only to ceasing the monetization of deficits via peso printing. And yet, they also argued that the austerity measures anchored the future money supply and swiftly boosted money demand.
True, ceasing Treasury financing with new pesos eliminated one of the means for the new money to quickly enter the market through government spending and thus affect prices. And the overall spending reduction helped in this regard as well. But leaving aside the fact that price inflation figures are elaborated from an arbitrary selection of items chosen by a government agency, B&F did not take into account several crucial factors that explain how price inflation could slow down while money printing and money demand increased at the same time:
- a) With the initial 54% devaluation and the removal of transport and energy subsidies and various price controls, money demand (peso demand) was bound to increase due to legal tender laws and the need to cope with the rising cost of living. The number of people selling their saved dollars for pesos to make ends meet increased
- b) Besides tax payments in pesos, exchange and capital controls—which hinder dollar demand—favored peso demand even further, because people continued to demand money anyway.
- c) The inflow of new dollars into the banking system with the amnesty program helped the central bank (BCRA) to cope with dollar demand in the exchange market. For half of these deposits go to the BCRA, thus helping to control the dollar price.
- d) The new pesos going to commercial banks, such as those coming from the BCRA’s operations, would not always go right to the purchase of goods and services and quickly affect prices. But they undoubtedly helped credit expansion.
- e) The argument that exchange controls could not be a significant causal factor because they already existed when Milei arrived is flawed. As private credit was virtually dead and financial strategies were unattractive before Milei, exchange controls became a significant factor for money demand once inflationary expectations went down, private credit revived and the role of fractional reserve banking returned to the stage. This, together with credit expansion, made investment opportunities in the peso interest rate and the official dollar price very favorable for certain groups, since they assumed that the exchange rate would remain stable and the peso interest rate would exceed the peso devaluation rate (set by the BCRA). Hence, a great demand for pesos for financial strategies eased by monetary policy followed, including an upturn in the government securities market, while the BCRA continued to meet dollar demand. This ensures that large amounts of pesos remain within the financial system for quite a while without entering the market for goods and services.
Quality of Money
B&F indicated that the quality of the monetary regime was improved by restructuring the BCRA’s balance sheet, with a larger part of the monetary base backed with dollar reserves. Yet, this hardly matters for most people’s demand for pesos, while it matters most to public creditors and financial investors, especially because the BCRA is the largest supplier of dollars and government securities are also issued in dollars. But to say that these and the other measures were responsible for reducing both price inflation and interest rates is to ignore the factors above, as well as the fact that the lower interest rates induced by central banking are first set to encourage credit expansion and thus money demand. And indeed, five of the six interest rate cuts until September 2024 took place in just two months between March and May.
Also, B&F echoed something that ended up being yet another myth for government propaganda, when they reported that the monetary base would not be allowed to grow anymore, thus further “improving” the quality of the monetary regime. Of course, this did not happen, and Milei himself recognized later that they had not been withdrawing all the pesos issued for the purchase of dollars.
On the other hand, digging into Bagus’ academic article on the quality of money, it is important how the quantity of money is expected to change—so ceasing Treasury financing increased the quality of the peso. However, if the institutional setting of a central bank is relevant, that of the BCRA had essentially not changed. Additionally, since the institutional setting of the currency determines the quality of money, the effects of specific measures on the currency and its use are also relevant. In Argentina, some measures improve the quality of the peso for certain individuals by offering them very special advantages from its use. Thus, the government can also drive different valuations over the quality of money among people. Accordingly, the less monetary regulations and arbitrariness there are, the more people will benefit from measures that increase the quality of money. And if a formally “independent” central bank improves the quality of the currency, this is neither the BCRA’s case, given that Milei himself has claimed to be directly involved in setting the initial devaluation.
Likewise, Bagus argues that the central bank’s statutes can limit to a certain extent the potential increase in the money supply, and that its mandates play a role in the way the quantity of money is expected to increase, thus affecting the quality of money. Yet, as things stood, especially before the reduction in exchange and capital controls implemented in April 2025, the BCRA’s mandates failed to ensure any limits or clear expectations for the potential increase in the money supply. The BCRA intervened in the exchange market, buying and selling dollars regularly. But since borrowing and surpluses are limited, it became impossible to stop printing new pesos entirely for dollar purchases—because of the need to balance the exchange market in accordance with the government’s commitments and exchange rate objectives. Meanwhile, the official exchange rates overvalued the peso, and importers and exporters were forced to exchange their money with the BCRA. And as the government wanted to balance dollar supply in the broad exchange market, exporters, for example, were forced to sell 20% of their dollars in the parallel market.
Bagus also notes that the ideology of the central bank’s president and its staff influences the quality of money. But with an economic team of people from previous administrations, including those responsible for the problems Milei inherited, how can one expect big improvements in monetary policy? In the past, Milei himself accused his current finance minister of irresponsibly spending US$15 billion of reserves and thus causing a disaster at the BCRA in 2017.
Furthermore, shortly before the elections, Milei advised not to put time deposits in pesos, and said that the peso could not be worth even excrement, since it was printed by politicians who, in Milei’s words, were not even good as fertilizers. In fact, many Argentinians expected a swift dollarization, and it is safe to say that Milei himself induced a currency run and a rise in the dollar price in the informal market close to his inauguration. So, if comments by politicians can immediately alter the quality of money, unless the quality of Argentina’s politicians has changed much by September 2024, something that even Milei’s own cabinet cannot prove, it is unwarranted that the quality of the monetary regime has improved greatly. Much less so when the man who became the president of the country contributed to worsening the quality of the peso before he won the election.
Public Debt and Central Banking
Central banking and public debt explain why Milei’s surpluses have not prevented the issuance of pesos and government securities. For one, a central bank’s open market operations are off-budget transactions that affect the money supply. For another, short of debt repudiation, the accumulated public debt does not disappear with a new government administration, and government securities do not require current deficits to continue. And on top of everything else, banking and political elites have incentives to continue both central banking and public debt.
But it is also true that surpluses are not necessarily better than deficits, since both total government spending and total government revenues must be considered while determining the impact of fiscal affairs on the economy. And the surpluses used for paying debts held by commercial banks will not lead to a credit contraction and the correction of misalignments caused by credit inflation, but to more credit inflation and misalignments.
Conclusion
Monetary inflation does not immediately determine price inflation, but it intrinsically leads to it, because prices will be higher than they would have been without the increase in the money supply. Indeed, price inflation never ceased under Milei, even though it went down. However, something more important than the impact of monetary inflation on price increases is the damage caused to the wealth generation process. For it triggers an exchange of nothing for something and distorts the structure of prices and production, thus diverting wealth from wealth generators to non-wealth generators. And while the increase in money demand partially offset the effects of monetary and credit inflation on price inflation, the new money—whether in fiduciary media or not—was not distributed equally among all, but went to certain people. Consequently, there were major net beneficiaries of Milei’s monetary policy at the expense of many more people.
While B&F devoted considerable space to discussing the problems caused by the government administrations that preceded Milei, the fact that a previous administration was responsible for implementing certain policies does not absolve Milei of the blame for maintaining them for so long. Otherwise, the past may become an eternal excuse to defend any administration or, worse, to be part of a propaganda effort in the intellectual cover-up of political power. Nonetheless, although it has improved recently, Milei’s monetary policy has been an example of a remarkable centrally planned monetary policy. Whether on exchange rate, money supply or public debt, the policies pursued so far have virtually nothing to do with the free and sound money postulates of the Austrian School of Economics—from which B&F’s ideological convictions and academic experience derive.
Therefore, one would have expected B&F to see through government propaganda and not make so many mistakes in assessing Milei’s monetary policy—especially in the case of a monetary specialist like Bagus. But both empirically and theoretically, B&F failed to provide a correct explanation of Argentina’s monetary affairs. And in light of Bagus’ own academic work, the improvement in the quality of the monetary regime was clearly less significant than argued by Milei’s defenders.
Part Three: Foreign Policy
As appears in “Javier Milei Is a Neocon” (July 2025):
In April 2024, Javier Milei, current president of Argentina, said that his guiding stars were the well-known libertarian thinkers Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe. Milei’s foreign policy and interventionist views suggest quite otherwise. Nevertheless, in September 2024, economists Philipp Bagus and Bernardo Ferrero (B&F) argued that Milei is not a neocon, but indeed a libertarian.
Strange enough, in parallel, Milei’s statements proving his support for American-Zionist imperialism are all over the place. Here are just a few of them until September 2024:
Israel, I consider such an ally that I’ve said that I will move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
I’ve indicated my alignment with the United States, with Israel and with the free world… I’m not willing… to establish relations with those who don’t respect liberal democracy… individual freedoms… and peace.
I argued… to endorse Israel’s right to legitimate self-defense… whatever [Israel] is doing, it is doing it within the rules of the game… Israel is not committing a single excess… despite the excesses committed by Hamas’ terrorists.
It’s so important to understand the link of freedom with Israel… because it’s a people… that has achieved… the conjunction between the spiritual and the material, and that spiritual-material harmony generates progress.
I consider the United States as an ally, regardless of whether it’s governed by a Democrat or a Republican.
[On the protests against the genocide in Gaza] I find the anti-Semitic behavior that is taking place in some [American] universities aberrant…
We stand on the right side of history… on the side of Israel… of the United States… of the West… and we’ll use all resources to defend ourselves against terrorists.
[At the UN]… it has been systematically voted against the State of Israel, which is the only country in the Middle East that defends liberal democracy.
Rothbard on the Neocons
True, no neocon, as B&F argue, had explicitly said that the state is a bunch of crooks and that they hate the state, but it is also true that no neocon has ever stopped doing what Rothbard condemned in 1992 either—which is exactly what Milei does:
… what animates the neocons first and foremost is foreign policy: The dominant and constant star of that foreign policy is the preservation and the aggrandizement, over all other considerations, of the State of Israel, the “little democracy in the Middle East.” Consequently, they favor massive foreign aid, especially to the State of Israel, and America as the dominant force in a New World Order that will combat “aggression” everywhere and impose “democracy” throughout the world, the clue to that “democracy” being not so much voting and free elections as stamping out “human rights violations” throughout the globe, particularly any expression, real or imagined, of anti-Semitism.
Thus, the fact that Milei says what he says about the state, while supporting amazingly murderous states, only worsens his situation. It is one more reason to label Milei as a hypocrite, who will sanctify Israel and try to help all his warmongering friends from Washington and NATO just as any other neocon. This is the reason why Argentina applied to be a global partner of NATO last year.
However, why should libertarians owe Milei not only the benefit of the doubt, but also their full support, if he behaves like just another member of a bunch of crooks? Why should libertarians take seriously his alleged intention to destroy the state from within if he has been praising and supporting statists who certainly do not want to destroy it? Such are the cases of Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Benjamin Netanyahu. But no one in their right mind can take seriously someone who promises to fight crime when they are found praising and supporting criminals. To illustrate, Milei called Zelenskyy “an inspiration for the world,” and Zelenskyy thanked Milei for doing “everything” he asked him. Yet so badly do B&F want libertarians to conform to Milei’s foreign policy that dictator Zelenskyy and mass murderer Netanyahu slipped off their list of Milei allies.
Hoppe on the Neocons
In 2001, Hoppe summarized the neocons as follows:
The neoconservative movement… emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the American left became increasingly involved with Black Power politics, affirmative action, pro-Arabism, and the “counterculture.” In opposition to these tendencies, many traditional left-wing… intellectuals and cold war “liberals,”… broke ranks with their old allies, frequently crossing over from the long-time haven of left-wing politics… to the Republicans. Since then the neoconservatives… have gained unrivaled influence in American politics, promoting typically a “moderate” welfare state (“democratic capitalism”), “cultural conservatism” and “family values,” and an interventionist (“activist”) and in particular Zionist (“pro-Israel”) foreign policy.
Milei almost perfectly meets Hoppe’s description. His “cultural conservatism” can be seen in his opposition to feminism and so-called wokism. And although B&F say that Milei is an ardent critic of the welfare state, his “opposition” to it was pitiful during the presidential campaign. So “moderate” was Milei already that he not only promised to maintain welfare programs, but went so far as to call welfare recipients “victims of injustice,” arguing that the corrupt intermediaries of welfare were the victimizers—as if this corruption could be possible without any willing recipients. For Milei, the issue should be tackled through economic growth, which would invite people to abandon welfare. But welfarism encourages people to remain in it, and the example of much richer countries does not favor Milei’s thesis either. What’s more, in June 2024, a minister of Milei even boasted about the increased spending on various welfare programs.
Trump and Ludwig von Mises
B&F considered it ironic to denounce Milei as a neocon, whilst criticizing him for supporting and being a Trump ally. For Trump was, as they said when considering his first term in office at the time, the least interventionist American president of the last two decades. Additionally, B&F raise a question:
… if one is keen, just for his geo-political sympathies and pro-NATO stance, to declare Milei a neocon, what would one have to say of Mises who looking at post-war Europe argued for the establishment of a “permanent and lasting union” among western democracies and for “vesting all power in a new supernational authority” in order to avoid subjugation to totalitarianism… why should Milei’s position and statements be treated all that differently?
Criticism of Milei as a neocon holds up without his disconcerting Trumpism, which also does not make Milei look any better as a supposed libertarian. But even if Trump was the least interventionist, he has not been much better than the others. Actually, Trump was worse in certain aspects—as when revoking Barack Obama’s rule on reporting drone strike deaths and surpassing the drone strike numbers of Obama’s eight years in just two years.
The fact that Trump is just another warmonger in chief had already been true in his first term. For instance, he continued bombing foreign countries, increased military spending greatly, and vetoed ending military aid for the Saudi war in Yemen. So weak is B&F’s argument that the same could be said about the least interventionist after Trump. Because each president, with the circumstances that accompanied each one, basically added his imperialist novelties on top of the imperialism of the former. Something that the very second term of Trump proves.
Lastly, Mises never called himself an anarcho-capitalist. Therefore, Mises, who remained firmly rooted in the classical liberal tradition until his death, may be treated somewhat differently, since libertarians are logically more demanding of self-proclaimed anarcho-capitalists. Moreover, Mises was an opponent of imperialism and his classical liberalism cannot justify a defense of the State of Israel either. And yet, whatever Mises’ error, this does not make Milei any less wrong. At most, it makes Mises deserving proper criticism.
Ideas Move the World
According to B&F, not so much importance should realistically be given to Milei’s foreign policy, because Argentina practically does not influence anything on that level:
The support and change of bloc executed by Milei implies no moving away from the ideal with respect to the previous situation. His foreign policy stance is, for practical purposes, purely testimonial.
To begin with, Milei has displayed neoconservative views even years before being president, so he has not executed anything contrary to his long-held convictions. Certainly, in a sense, Milei’s foreign policy matters little, because Argentina’s army was never meant to decide the war in Ukraine, or to provide any substantial aid to Israel. But being a world star, the wider public links Milei’s foreign policy and views to the libertarian movement, which harms the movement’s reputation and goals. Thus, as the antiwar cause is a top priority for libertarians and the prevalence of some ideas has dire consequences, Milei’s foreign policy is truly relevant for practical purposes, not purely testimonial. For only public opinion, driven by the right ideas, will one day be able to exert sufficient pressure to bring about major improvements for peace. Milei, instead, has gone against Rothbard on the most important issue:
Since war and foreign policy provide the State with its easiest means of delusion and deception, Revisionist exposure on the foreign affairs front is the most important avenue of desanctification and delegitimation of the State apparatus and of State aggression.
Over the years, Milei has not only held views favorable to interventionism in foreign affairs, but also admiration for historical figures unequivocally in favor of war and statism, such as Winston Churchill.
In any case, B&F stress that “Milei engages in the popularization of Austro-libertarian ideas that are diametrically opposed to statism and neoconservatism.” However, as the true Austro-libertarians Octavio Bermúdez and Kristoffer Hansen have shown, apart from a few talking points, Milei does not demonstrate any significant knowledge of Austrian economics. Worse yet, he reveals a remarkable cognitive dissonance in his list and opinions regarding his favorite economists. And his knowledge of libertarianism, for example, of the work of Rothbard and Hoppe is no better. What all this implies is that Milei’s popularization of Austro-libertarian ideas is for the most part insignificant, because his popularization cannot be much better than his scant knowledge of such ideas.
Ultimately, the best B&F can do is to hold on to their unconvincing claim that Milei is not a neocon in the “traditional” sense of the term. And still, their justification for this claim can only be validated by denying several ideas of Rothbard and Hoppe and much evidence given by Milei’s own words—or, in fact, their justification can even be used against Milei himself. Take, for example, Milei’s militaristic policies, which are embellished by his celebration of the armed forces, his bragging about buying fighter jets, and his desire to get people to support ideas as essential to statism as national defense and the cult of the state soldier. To this must be added the promotion of the defense industry as fundamental to national development, the paternalism of the war on drugs, and the maintenance and increase of various welfare programs.
Jewish Elites
Without ever presenting Milei’s own justifications, B&F try to convince readers that Milei’s change of bloc is related to the way the Argentine citizenry perceives the matter, to the almost two decades of Kirchnerist flirting with the “eastern” bloc, and to cases of corruption and mismanagement—as if cases like these were not to happen anyway. However, beyond the fact that Argentina never had a particularly bad relationship with the “western” bloc under the Kirchnerists, what B&F do not tell is that the real reason why Milei looked to the other side as he did is his intimate relationship with Jewish elites. Though mainly propped up by Jewish figures in Argentina, Milei has never hidden who he serves above all.
In the past, besides being friends with famous Jewish journalist Mauricio Viale, who died in 2021, Milei was syndicated in some Zionist controlled newspapers and regularly featured on TV shows. In 2021, when he was running for congress, Milei struck up a relationship with Rabbi Axel Wahnish. Known as Milei’s spiritual advisor, Wahnish became through Milei the first rabbi to be appointed ambassador to Israel. With Wahnish, Milei studied Torah and got close to the Argentine Jewish community, the sixth largest in the world. Subsequently, Milei reached out to the Chabad-Lubavitch movement, meeting Rabbi Tzvi Grunblatt and Eduardo Elsztain. Grunblatt is the leader of this movement in Argentina. And Elsztain is a real estate billionaire commonly known as the “Owner of Argentina,” also involved in a wide variety of businesses, including agriculture, mining and others.
Aside from Elsztain’s support for his presidential candidacy, Milei obtained the support of other important Jewish actors, such as Gerardo Werthein, a member of the Werthein Group holding company, and Daniel Sielecki, a pharmaceutical entrepreneur. And eventually, Milei got the crucial support of rival candidate Patricia Bullrich for the ballot, another major ally of the Jews. Bullrich is now Milei’s security minister, but also held that position in 2017, when she signed on behalf of the Argentine government an agreement with the State of Israel on cooperation in public security and internal affairs. Bullrich’s husband, Guillermo Yanco, is a noted Zionist. He is a former vice president of the Holocaust Museum in Argentina, and a member of an international organization funded by American taxpayers, which has been accused of links to CIA interference in foreign countries.
Milei’s campaign headquarters was located in a hotel owned by Elsztain. And right after winning the presidency, on a private jet of the Wertheins, Milei went to New York City, where bankers and the grave of Chabad Rabbi Menachem Schneerson expected him. Werthein was initially appointed by Milei as ambassador to the United States. But in October 2024, Werthein became foreign minister, following Diana Mondino’s mistake of not voting with Israel in favor of the United States regarding the embargo on Cuba.
Other Jewish figures in Milei’s entourage include Julio Goldstein, linked to business and politics, and Marcelo Duclos, a writer who, like Bagus, wrote a book to celebrate Milei. And there is also Dario Epstein, one of Milei’s advisors during the 2023 campaign, and whom Milei supported in the 2024 elections of the Delegation of Argentine Israelite Associations, known for its fight against anti-Semitism.
Since Milei took office in December 2023, beyond the fervent Zionist foreign policy, the Argentine government has gotten closer than ever to other Israeli interests, including rapprochement with Israeli companies in lithium development projects and cooperation in water management.
Conclusion
Milei’s constant worship of Judaism, Jews and the State of Israel has earned him the latest Jewish Nobel Prize. But while for libertarians, when faced with libertarianism and Zionism, the choice is never in favor of the latter, Milei made the opposite choice.
Furthermore, given that Milei is a neocon and, therefore, an enemy of the libertarian cause, libertarians cannot be Mileists. Here, B&F made their choice, and had the audacity to praise Milei’s “paradigm shift” as a historical reality that should give us hope for the future. Nonetheless, what this supposed paradigm shift should give us is not hope, but a valuable lesson not to fall back into the propaganda of warmongering and genocidal elites. And finally, given the Austro-libertarian reputation of B&F, libertarians should accuse both of being covert allies of such elites.
Part Four: Overall Fiscal Burden
As appears in an excerpt from “Prosperity Thanks to Zionist Rule in Argentina Is Propaganda” (August 2025):
In September 2024, despite the tax increases, two propagandists of Milei claimed that he “slashed” the overall fiscal burden, since, as they hold, regulations and inflation are taxes.
First, while regulations are forced rules that hinder free enterprise without necessarily leading to a property transfer to the government, taxes are always forced property transfers to the government. Typically, regulations require costs that would not otherwise be incurred. But if any cost is paid to the government rather than to private parties, that cost is a tax, which must be accounted for in the tax burden. In short, regulations are not taxes and are not part of the tax burden, even though they allow the government to exert some control over the use of private resources.
In any case, leaving aside some regulatory missteps, such as meddling with wage increases, Milei’s deregulations enable higher productivity and are a big step towards a freer economy.
Second, while inflation reduces the purchasing power of money, which basically means that people are robbed just as with taxation, the greatest harm of inflation is not its impact on prices, but its impact on the wealth generation process. Inflation distorts the structure of prices and production, and diverts wealth from wealth generators to non-wealth generators. However, prior to September 2024, the official monetary base (M0) increased 128.9% during Milei’s term and 67% before him for the same amount of time. Worse, the comparison up to June 2025 shows an increase of 287.1% with Milei and 137.9% before him. Therefore, as the only unequivocal way to quantify inflation is money printing, if inflation is defined as a tax, the Milei administration raised the inflation tax substantially, regardless of the price inflation figures published by the government.
Thus, not only had the overall fiscal burden not been slashed, but it had increased. Moreover, as Argentinians were already saving in dollars before Milei and the peso has remained worse than the dollar at protecting purchasing power, the constant forced overvaluation of the peso, coupled with rising prices, has had its own negative impact on people’s savings. This in turn negatively affects the ability to invest.
Part Five: Political Strategy
As appears in an excerpt from “In Defense of Murray Rothbard’s Legacy” (January 2026):
In September 2024, Bagus teamed up (B&F) with Mises University Alumnus Bernardo Ferrero to defend Argentina’s president from criticism. While B&F have already been refuted in the areas of public debt, monetary policy, foreign policy, and fiscal policy, the area of political strategy had remained unanswered until now. They argued that Milei was following the description of a libertarian politician:
[Who] sometimes must make compromises without never steering into the wrong direction… [Who] should use a dual strategy… [Who] should study the theoretical principles of libertarianism and educate the general public about these principles and its implications, engaging in a work of divulgation of libertarian ideas. To this effect no compromises shall be accepted.
Being aware of his long-term objectives, the libertarian politician shall also look for possible transition plans toward the ideal which do not violate libertarian principles. If it is impossible to evade a short-term compromise, he may concede such a compromise as long as they move in the right direction. In no case, a set of measures shall move away from a more libertarian society… The libertarian politician must make use of his specific knowledge of time and space assessing the effective restrictions that real political life offers…
Only by using this dual strategy can one avoid those two extremes that Murray Rothbard considered detrimental for the advancement of freedom: “right-wing opportunism” and “left-wing sectarianism”. If the former is a “politics without principle”, unable to give a non-arbitrary foundation to political action, the latter is a “principle without politics”…
In reality, Rothbard wanted libertarians to heed the lessons of the Marxists:
… the Marxists see two critically important strategic fallacies that “deviate” from the proper path: one they call “left-wing sectarianism”; the other, and opposing, deviation is “right-wing opportunism.” The critics of libertarian “extremist” principles are the analog of the Marxian “right-wing opportunists.” The major problem with the opportunists is that by confining themselves strictly to gradual and “practical” programs, programs that stand a good chance of immediate adoption, they are in grave danger of completely losing sight of the ultimate objective, the libertarian goal. He who confines himself to calling for a two percent reduction in taxes helps to bury the ultimate goal of abolition of taxation altogether. By concentrating on the immediate means, he helps liquidate the ultimate goal, and therefore the point of being a libertarian in the first place. If libertarians refuse to hold aloft the banner of the pure principle, of the ultimate goal, who will? The answer is no one, hence another major source of defection from the ranks in recent years has been the erroneous path of opportunism.
In short, Milei exemplifies right-wing opportunism. His principles, if he has any, are in shambles or contradict those of Rothbard, and his three-stage reform plan was proposed to be implemented in a specific sequence. Rothbard, instead, spoke of a dangerous temptation in the tendency to appear “realistic” when establishing any kind of planned program of transition toward the goal of liberty. One problem with such a plan is that it implies that certain actions will not be taken until others have preceded. This is what Rothbard called the trap of gradualism-in-theory. Planners would seem to oppose a faster pace or different measures toward greater freedom than what they have planned. Rothbard’s strategic outlook was very different:
… the libertarian’s concern should not be to use the State to embark on a measured course of destatization, but rather to hack away at any and all manifestations of statism whenever and wherever he or she can.
And in his 1994 essay “A New Strategy for Liberty,” Rothbard stated:
I was always opposed to the marginal reform strategy… I always thought that any marginal and dubious short-run gains would be earned only at the price of a disastrous long-run abandonment of and therefore defeat for the principles of liberty.
As if it were not embarrassing enough for B&F that candidate Milei was already a neocon, meaning he cannot be a libertarian politician, his cabinet has been filled mostly with old career politicians. No libertarian hope there either.
Certainly, making concessions in politics can be understandable or inevitable, even for libertarians. But Milei makes virtually none, as he often defends his bad policies as good ones. In other words, Zionism, militarism, the persecution of “anti-Semitism,” the war on drugs, and other policies are not recognized by Milei as mistakes at all, but rather it is Milei’s own conviction to carry them out in this manner. And speaking of effective restrictions, Milei did not need congressional support to take much better action in these areas or in the other areas of government where B&F are also wrong. Despite some good policies, which have occasionally also been seen in global politics without any “anarcho-capitalist” president, Milei has gone in the wrong direction so many times that it seems impossible for him to disappoint his “Austro-libertarian” defenders.
Besides, as it was demonstrated by Mises University Alumnus Octavio Bermúdez before B&F’s article and a year later by Kristoffer Hansen, a Fellow at the Mises Institute, Milei’s economic thinking involves numerous “compromises” in terms of spreading the right ideas. But if Milei “has studied libertarian and Austrian ideas in depth,” as B&F maintain, then defending him would be even worse, as it would mean that Milei consciously teaches many things different from Austro-libertarianism.
Rothbard also warned about the harm done to the ultimate goal by rhetorical flourishes that confuse the public and contradict principle. And even as a supposed libertarian, Milei has always harmed the ultimate goal. Take, for example, his 2024 speech at the United Nations, where Milei uses the word “anarchy” negatively, aspires to the hackneyed maxim of limited government, and even quotes Woodrow Wilson in a positive light.
Appendix: Falsehoods and Half-Truths About Me in B&F’s Defense of Milei
B&F began their article by stating that I did not look favorably at Milei’s entry into politics or his measures as president. Although I had made my reservations, above all about foreign policy, I did look favorably at his entry into politics and wished for him to win. After all, at the beginning, I was optimistic and pleased with Milei’s victory. Though still a bit unaware of the magnitude of Milei’s flaws, I thanked Milei for winning with a mostly libertarian approach, despite some significant errors in spreading libertarian ideas. In addition, I was also aware of Milei’s positive measures as president and acknowledged them in several articles.
Nonetheless, B&F also falsely accused me of treating Milei’s followers as “opportunistic sell-outs.” To be fair, such cases do exist, as politicians have always bought off intellectuals to defend themselves, but I had never said that about Milei’s followers in general. In fact, it would have been absurd to say so, since the average citizen who cheers on politicians does not have the same opportunities to sell out as academics and journalists usually do.
On the other hand, B&F stated that I depicted Milei as “a plain neoclassical” economist, but this was also false. Against faulty presentations, such as that of Bagus, who described Milei as an Austrian, it was Octavio Bermúdez who revealed—before B&F’s piece—that Milei had not yet escaped the neoclassical trap. Instead, one of the few things I had ever written about Milei as an economist was that he ranked far above the mainstream. And yet, they did not provide any single link to back up their various falsehoods and half-truths about me.
Anyway, following up on their article, B&F also said that I had omitted the “most crucial” part of Milei’s famous deregulation decree at the beginning of his term:
Omitted by Grau, the most crucial part of this deregulation decree was the modification of article 958 of the Civil and Commercial Code, whereby the government relegated legal norms to a lower plan than the will of the partied expressed in contracts.
However, one quote is enough to undermine the relevance of that accusation:
Milei deregulated the economy to some extent with a decree that removed or modified hundreds of laws, including several price controls. After repealing the rental law that generated housing shortages, the effect was immediate: supply increased… and contracts are now entirely decided by the parties involved, including what currency will be used in the transaction.
Though not citing the specific law that was amended, I did not completely omit the deregulation in question. Nor did they cite many other particular laws either amended or repealed. As seen, what I wrote about contracts was strictly related to my supposed omission. Yet, there are also opportunity costs in writing an article, and I decided not to explore in detail Milei’s deregulations when I could acknowledge his efforts in this area and thus save space for other things, especially those that his defenders dare not mention and which are more crucial when it comes to making a correct general assessment of the Milei phenomenon.
Final Conclusion
On reflection, my assessment of Milei preceding B&F’s article now strikes me as too generous, especially since I was not yet sufficiently prepared to address monetary issues in greater detail. Even so, regardless of my merits or shortcomings, B&F defended Milei by resorting to all sorts of falsehoods, half-truths, poorly substantiated arguments, and truly critical omissions.
Today, after more than two and a half years in power, Mileism has only gotten worse, ranging from Milei’s recent warmongering tirades against Iran on behalf of Israel to his administration’s defense of intellectual property. The “anarcho-capitalist” Milei sees himself as “the most Zionist president in the world,” and he has indeed been a champion of Zionist statism. The somewhat anti-statist spirit that characterized much of Milei’s rise to power has been effectively neutralized by Mileism itself. And, finally, the initial push for greater freedom demonstrated by Milei’s own victory has been lost, precisely because most Argentinians now associate his failure and policies with the implementation of libertarian ideas.
Meanwhile, despite Milei’s promises, the BCRA is still there, after being saved by Milei himself. To cap it all, since Milei quadrupled the monetary base in less than two years, his supposedly great monetary achievements are an outright farce, as he is, in reality, a notorious example of coercive inflation. This has turned Milei into one of the most inflationist presidents in Argentina’s history. And as for the much-touted fiscal surplus, it has proven to be a smokescreen to hide a massive monetary redistribution under the BCRA’s direction.
No matter how positive some of Milei’s policies might have been, they are mostly insignificant when considering his disastrous overall performance. The damage caused by Milei’s association with Austro-libertarianism is global, and B&F are conscious accomplices of the deception. For this reason, any Austro-libertarian or Austro-libertarian organization that is up to standard with the moral integrity and courage required by the Austro-libertarian cause should stop to nurture friendship and association with this pair of propagandists.
